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Executive Summary
The coming election could have profound implications 
for the shape of the UK state for decades to come
The general election campaign we have just entered, the fourth 
in a decade, will inevitably be dominated by Brexit. But the 
domestic policy agenda is also sure to feature – not least because 
the major parties appear to be aligned in their determination to 
pull away from the austerity decade by pursuing ambitious (code 
for big) new spending plans. And while Brexit will of course 
generate a lot of heat, it is on the domestic agenda that we must 
hope the parties can shed most light. That’s because the UK’s 
public finances are currently at a turning point, and the agenda 
laid out by the next government has the potential to define what 
happens in the UK for many years to come.
The need for the parties to present strategic, wide-angle 
approaches to their new spending plans – resisting the 
temptation to deliver no more than sticking plasters and election 
enticements – rests on the coming together of three factors, 
relating to the past, the present and the future of the public 
finances. 
Looking backwards, the spending restraint of the austerity 
period and the political priorities pursued by successive 
governments within this constraint has placed major strain on 
a number of public services. In short, the size of the state has 
changed over the past decade but so too has its shape. 
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Focusing on the present, whoever forms the next government 
will need to locate their spending plans within a new fiscal 
framework. The existing fiscal rulesthat guide the government’s 
approach are no longer in effect, and are in any case about to 
expire in some instances. The ambitions the parties set out 
for growing the size of the state must therefore sit alongside 
coherent new rules that reflect today’s economic realities (the 
low interest rate environment and current heightened risk 
of recession for instance) while supporting continued fiscal 
sustainability. We can’t expect the election debate to major on 
the technicalities of deficit and debt rules, but serious visions for 
the future of Britain should rest on serious new fiscal outlines 
too.
Looking forwards, the next government must also contend 
with the demographic headwinds that are about to start 
blowing. While we have long discussed the ageing society, its real 
impact is only due to start hitting over the course of the next 
parliament as members of the large baby boomer generation 
retire in significant number – with effects that then build over 
the decades that follow. In the absence of policy change, this 
demographic march has profound implications for both the size 
and shape of the UK state – in many ways doubling-down on the 
policy-driven shifts recorded over the past decade. 
The two biggest parties appear aligned in their ambition 
to increase state spending – potentially returning it to 
1970s levels
The austerity programme delivered since 2010 has produced an 
unprecedentedly long pause in the real-terms spending growth 
that has characterised the majority of the post-WWII period. 
Total managed expenditure (TME) increased by just £5 billion (or 
0.6 per cent) between 2010-11 and 2018-19, with this eight-year flat-
lining eclipsing the six-year pause recorded in the 1980s and far 
outstripping any other previous period of austerity.
And measured on a per capita basis instead – which much better 
captures the lived experience of austerity – the restraint appears 
even more marked. Government spending per person is set to 
come very slightly under £13,000 in 2019-20 (in 2018-19 prices), 
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which remains 3.6 per cent down on the 2010-11 peak of £13,465. 
Under the plans in place ahead of the election, this peak isn’t 
expected to be surpassed until 2023-24. Such a 13-year pause 
would almost double the seven-year record associated with 
privatisation in the 1980s. 
But the direction of travel has shifted over the past year. Philip 
Hammond promised to deliver an end to austerity during 
the latter part of his tenure as Chancellor, and Sajid Javid has 
followed through. The Spending Round set out in September 
concerned itself with only 43 per cent of TME (that part relating 
to Whitehall departmental expenditure limits, or DEL) and it 
looked only one year into the future (updating plans for 2019-20 
and 2020-21), but it was nevertheless a big deal.
The Chancellor added £2.1 billion to the existing 2019-20 spending 
plans, along with an extra £13.4 billion for 2020-21. That translates 
into a plan to raise real-terms DEL by £13.8 billion (or 4.1 per 
cent) in 2020-21 relative to 2019-20 – the biggest average annual 
increase in departmental budgets earmarked at any spending 
round since 2002.
As a share of GDP then, TME now appears to be on an upward 
trajectory once again. The current plans result in spending rising 
to 40.6 per cent of GDP; still well down on the immediate post-
crisis peak of 46.6 per cent, but slightly above the ratio recorded 
just before the crisis struck, and well up on the 37.4 per cent of 
GDP logged between 1985-86 and 2007-08. 
Nevertheless, the UK state remains relatively modest by 
international standards. The UK’s expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
increased from 80 per cent of the OECD average in 1998 to 96 
per cent in 2006. And it very briefly surpassed it following the 
financial crisis, peaking 1 per cent above the average in 2012. But 
it has since fallen back, and currently stands at around 95 per 
cent of the OECD average. The UK state spends more in relative 
terms than the US, Korea and Ireland, but significantly less than 
France, Finland and Sweden.
However, pre-election plans look like they will be quickly 
replaced by new ones that push the size of the UK state 
somewhat higher – whoever forms the next government.
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In presenting the Spending Round, Sajid Javid also spoke 
of his ambition to establish a “new economic plan” over the 
years beyond 2020-21 that would shift the UK economy from 
“recovery” to “renewal”. He placed a particular emphasis on 
capital spending, saying that the “first priority of our new 
economic plan will be to rebuild our national infrastructure”. 
In more concrete terms, during his bid for the Conservative 
Party leadership back in the summer he outlined plans for a 
£100 billion (multi-year) “National Infrastructure Fund” targeted 
outside London. We might therefore expect the party’s manifesto 
to provide more detail of these ambitions, maintaining the 
Spending Round momentum on current expenditure and 
introducing new targets for capital spending.
Labour’s ambitions are longer-established and even further 
reaching. Its 2017 election manifesto included more than £70 
billion in new spending pledges, comprising £48.6 billion of day-
to-day spending (covering both departmental spend and social 
security payments) and £25 billion of capital (as part of a pledge 
to deliver a ten-year £250 billion “National Transformation 
Fund”). It is possible that some of the spending increases set out 
in September’s Spending Round could lower the extra funding 
required of a future Labour government to meet its previous 
policy goals. But the party has outlined a range of additional 
ambitions in recent months that imply that it intends to set out 
a 2019 manifesto pledge that is similar in scale to the 2017 one.
Of course, we won’t know the full extent of the two parties’ 
plans until we get the next set of manifestos. But we can present 
illustrative scenarios in order to explore what pursuing such 
ambitions might mean for the size of the UK state. 
Our modelling suggests that a ‘Conservative’ approach that 
delivers on the Spending Round commitments on current 
spending and thereafter maintains the value of that expenditure 
as a share of GDP, alongside delivering a £20 billion annual 
boost to the capital budget (on the assumption that something 
along the lines of the proposed “National Infrastructure Fund” is 
delivered over five years), would lift TME to 41.3 per cent of GDP 
by 2023-24. A similar outcome could alternatively be delivered 
by rolling the capital programme out more slowly, but very 
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modestly increasing day-to-day departmental spending as a 
share of GDP. Such a spending total would be higher than in any 
pre-crisis year since 1984-85, and would fall only slightly under 
the 42 per cent average recorded between 1966-67 and 1984-85. 
Following a Labour approach that tops up the post-Spending 
Round baseline to the tune of £49 billion of current spending 
and £25 billion of capital spending by 2023-24, lifts TME to 43.3 
per cent of GDP. That would take us back to 1982-83, and would 
stand as the ninth highest spending total in the entire post-war 
period.
These scenarios are indicative at this stage, but they are in line 
with the rhetoric we’ve heard from the two parties to date. What 
stands out is that both would push the UK state close to – or 
even above – 1970s levels of spending. The election therefore has 
the potential to reverse the Thatcher revolution on the public 
finances – despite parts of what the state did in the 1970s sitting 
today in private hands.
Ambitions for growing the size of the state sit against 
a backdrop which has been changed significantly by 
austerity 
Ahead of the introduction of ambitious new spending plans, 
the shadow of austerity remains all too real for large parts of 
the public sector – and for many households too. That shadow 
provides the context for the new spending plans being presented 
in the parties’ manifestos.
While real-terms TME has been broadly flat over the period 
since 2010, the split between different government functions 
has shifted considerably. For example, annually managed 
expenditure – that part of state spending which is less within 
the direct control of government, such as social security, debt 
interest and student loans – has continued to rise over the 
period. Flat TME has therefore converted into falling DEL, 
with the departmental total falling from 47 per cent of overall 
expenditure in 2009-10 to just 43 per cent in 2019-20.
Within that DEL total, the split between current spending 
(resource DEL, or RDEL) and capital spending (capital DEL, or 
CDEL) has remained largely unchanged – though the CDEL 
The shape of things to come | Executive Summary
Resolution Foundation
7
profile has been particularly volatile. Taking a longer view 
however, capital spending has been steadily recovering from 
the lows of the 1980s and 1990s since the turn of the century. On 
current plans, public sector net investment is projected to rise to 
2.6 per cent of GDP in 2020-21 – the highest level of investment 
since 1978-79 (outside of a fiscal stimulus-related spike in 2008-09 
and 2009-10).
Drilling down into the RDEL total – a figure which has fallen as a 
share of total spending (from 39 per cent in 2009-10 to 36 per cent 
in 2019-20), fallen as a share of GDP (from 18 per cent to 14 per 
cent) and fallen in real-terms (remaining some 5.2 per cent down 
on its 2009-10 peak in 2019-20) – we can see how policy choices 
have driven a profound shift in the nature of the UK’s public 
services. Spending on some departments and functions – like 
the NHS, foreign aid, schools and defence – have been subject 
to protection and prioritisation in different periods since 2010. 
That has meant that the burden of a falling overall envelope has 
rested heaviest on the remaining services – especially so given 
the large scale of many of the protected areas.
Day-to-day per capita spending on the Department of Health 
and Social Care is therefore on course to have risen by 14 
per cent between 2009-10 and 2019-20, with increases of 7 
per cent recorded by both the Department for International 
Development and the Home Office too. But the Local 
Government budget is due to have been cut by three-quarter 
(77 per cent), with several other departments (including Work 
and Pensions, Transport, Housing and Communities, and BEIS) 
facing cuts of between one-third and one-half. 
Such a profile has resulted in overall RDEL being increasingly 
health-dominated. The share of spend accounted for by the 
Department of Health and Social Care has increased by a third 
(from 31 per cent to 40 per cent) between 2009-10 and 2020-21. 
With the Department for Education and the Ministry of Defence 
broadly holding their share, and DFID increasing its to a still 
very modest 2 per cent of all RDEL, the remaining public services 
have experienced a 26 per cent reduction (from 38 per cent to 28 
per cent). 
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We have seen similarly marked changes in the composition of 
spending when focusing on social security. The overall total 
has risen by 24 per cent in real-terms since 2007-08 (taking the 
pre-crisis total as the baseline to avoid cyclical effects), but that 
equates to a 32 per cent increase for pensioner spend and a 16 per 
cent increase for all other individuals.
Demographic and economic trends have clearly contributed to 
this divergence of experience, but policy choices have been at 
play too. One of those choices – the decision to lift state pension 
age – has actually pushed back against the scale of increase in 
pensioner spending that we might otherwise have seen. But the 
pensioner bill has been pulled in the opposite direction by the 
deliberate decision to protect the generosity of the State Pension 
via the introduction of the triple lock. And that decision stands 
in direct contrast to the series of sharp cuts made to the access 
and generosity of working-age and child benefits. By 2023-24, 
pensioner social security spend per person is set to be 21.4 per 
cent higher than in 2007-08, whereas the per person spend for 
those under pension age is projected to be up by just 3.5 per cent. 
Just as health has increasingly come to dominate departmental 
spending then, so too has the State Pension accounted for an 
increasing share of the social security total. Its share is set to 
rise by 19 per cent between 2007-08 and 2020-21 (from 37 per cent 
to 44 per cent – more than two-fifths of all welfare spending). 
The biggest proportional increase is actually due to disability 
and incapacity benefits, which are set to increase their share by 
33 per cent (from 14 per cent in 2007-08 to 19 per cent in 2020-21). 
In contrast, the share allocated to Child Benefit over the same 
period is due to fall by 24 per cent (from 7 per cent to 5 per cent).
Taken together, these changes in public service and social 
security priorities have produced a profound shift in what the 
UK state does. Spending on health accounts for 20 per cent of 
total spend today, up from 18 per cent in 2007-08 and just 14 per 
cent in 1997-98. Likewise, spending on old age social security now 
takes up 17 per cent of the total, up from 15 per cent in 2007-08 
and 14 per cent in 1997-98. The biggest proportional declines over 
the past 20 years have been recorded in defence and public order, 
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with the former falling by 28 per cent (from 7 per cent to 5 per 
cent) and the latter dropping by 23 per cent (from 5 per cent to 4 
per cent). 
The parties’ election promises must also be grounded in 
the presentation of a robust new fiscal framework
Even before accounting for any post-election spending surge, 
the fiscal rules look set to be broken, leaving the UK effectively 
without a fiscal anchor. In laying out ambitious new spending 
plans as part of the election campaign therefore, the political 
parties must also take time to explain the fiscal framework they 
would want to put in place to ground that expenditure. 
The 2017 Labour manifesto included proposals for tax rises 
that would entirely match its £49 billion current spending 
pledge, alongside explicit plans for shifting to a new deficit rule 
that excluded capital spending. The proposed debt rule was 
less explicit though, with any significant increase in capital 
expenditure along the lines set out in our ‘Labour’ spending 
scenario almost inevitably requiring the establishment of a 
higher debt target (or a switch to focus on debt servicing costs 
instead). We might expect the Conservatives to take a broadly 
similar approach, reflecting Sajid Javid’s shared emphasis on 
raising capital spending. But meeting such a target would be 
made significantly harder by any attempt to follow through 
on the expensive tax cut pledges made by Boris Johnson 
during his leadership campaign. Fitting the parties spending 
ambitions within a new fiscal framework will therefore not be 
straightforward.
It will not be enough for the parties to simply tweak or extend 
the existing framework. Instead, they should reflect on the 
lessons of the past 20 years of fiscal rule development, seize the 
opportunities of the present, and respond to the challenges of 
the future. Global economic slowdown, the elevated risk of a UK 
recession and the prospect of Brexit around the corner all mean 
the new framework will need to guide fiscal policy through a 
period of unprecedented near-term uncertainty. But it must also 
enable it to address looming long-term economic, social, and 
environmental pressures. That means developing a set of rules 
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that are both more robust and more flexible; safeguarding fiscal 
sustainability in the long run while allowing policy to respond to 
a range of potential economic scenarios over the medium term. 
And the next government must also contend with the 
implications of the coming demographic headwind
Looking to the future, demographic change is set to continue 
the trend put in train by active policy choices over the past two 
decades – namely, rapidly increasing spending on old age and 
health. Combined, such spending currently accounts for 13 per 
cent of GDP. In ten years that figure could be 15 per cent, and 
may rise as high as 20 per cent by the middle of the century. That 
would mean spending on these two functions would go from 
accounting for 29 per cent of all (non-interest) spending in 1997-
98 to 36 per cent today and 44 per cent by 2037-38. By 2067-68, 
health and old age social security might account for 50p of every 
£1 spent.
Absent any change in approach in relation to other aspects 
of spending, overall government expenditure would need to 
continue rising as a share of GDP in order to meet increasing 
health and pension demand. That is, even before accounting for 
any spending promises set out by the next government as part 
of its election campaign, TME is on course to rise to 41 per cent 
by the end of the 2020s, 44 per cent by the end of the 2030s and 
49 per cent by 2067-68 – well above the post-war peak of 46.6 per 
cent recorded in 2009-10.
Such significant changes are not inevitable, of course. Future 
governments could choose to change the offer to their citizens – 
restricting access to healthcare and to pensions, or shifting some 
functions into the private sector. Equally, they could choose to 
squeeze spending on other services – effectively doubling down 
on the trends of the austerity decade. Alternatively, governments 
might try to deliver this significantly larger state – but to do 
so they will need to secure correspondingly large increases in 
government revenues. 
Crucially though, these demographic pressures will start to build 
over the course of the next parliament – meaning the different 
election contenders need to start developing their responses 
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now. Matching new spending preferences with growing spending 
needs will be a key challenge for the next government.
Alongside Brexit, we can expect the coming election campaign 
to be characterised by something of an arms race on spending. 
But before firing the gun on that race, it is important that our 
politicians take a step back and consider the past, present and 
future not just of the size of the UK state, but also its shape. 
Given that importance, we’ll be publishing two more pieces in 
this series over the coming weeks: one that focuses on changing 
shape of the UK’s tax base and one that looks at social security 
trends – spending time in both instances considering what the 
various parties’ election manifestos might mean for the shape of 
things to come. 
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Section 1
Introduction
Next month’s general election will, of course, be dominated by Brexit. But it also has 
the potential to play a major role in defining Britain’s domestic policy agenda for years 
to come. That’s because the UK’s public finances are at something of a turning point. 
Austerity has come to an end, and electioneering politicians are already articulating their 
willingness to turn the spending taps back on. But they are doing so against the backdrop 
of a triple public finance challenge that relates to the recent past, the present and the 
near future.
Looking first to the recent past, there is the need to deal with the fallout from austerity 
and the strain it has placed on many public services and on some household finances. 
Thinking about the here and now, the next government will need to establish a new fiscal 
framework that builds on the experience of past rules and meets the changed economic 
realities of today. And casting forward, the ageing society is set to create a fiscal 
headwind that very significantly increases the spending pressure on certain parts of the 
public sector over the course of the 2020s and beyond.
The nature of this triple challenge increases the importance of taking a wide-angle, 
strategic approach to spending in the coming years. Simply backing some favoured 
horses and offering voter-friendly giveaways risks producing a spending profile that is lop-
sided, inefficient, or unsustainable. In short, the election debate should focus not just on 
the size of the UK state being proposed by different parties, but also on its shape.
That’s where this report comes in. It takes a step back, by considering how the spending 
profile of the UK state has shifted over the longer term and how it might evolve over the 
coming years – all by way of providing context for the debate that is sure to follow. More 
specifically:
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• Section 2 focuses on how the size of the state has changed and how it might 
change further over the coming years. It explores movements in government 
spending and government receipts, alongside what that has meant for the country’s 
fiscal position. 
• Section 3 focuses instead on the shape of the UK state, drilling down into trends 
in different aspects of spending. It looks at how the balance of both public service 
and social security spending has shifted over time, with a particular emphasis on 
changes since the financial crisis and the subsequent era of austerity.
• Section 4 brings both elements of spending together to give a sense of how the 
overall purpose of the state has changed over the past two decades and how 
demographic change will affect things over the years to come. 
• Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
This is the first in a series of three pieces on the fiscal backdrop to the coming election. 
As the campaign develops, we will publish our analysis of the main political parties’ plans 
for tax and for welfare – taking the evolution of the country’s position on both areas as 
their jumping off points.
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Section 2
About the size of it
A decade of austerity in the public finances has resulted in an unprecedented pause 
in spending growth, with total managed expenditure rising by just £5 billion (or 0.6 
per cent) in real-terms between 2010-11 and 2018-19. But that pause is now over, 
with a rare political consensus about the desirability of a bigger state meaning that 
spending will almost certainly expand further over the coming years – whatever the 
composition of the next government. Measured relative to the size of the economy, 
that means government spending looks to be heading back towards the heights of the 
1970s. It has also moved closer to the OECD norm over the past 20 years, though it 
remains below the average for the time being.
Government revenues have also been rising, with receipts relative to the size of the 
economy expected to reach their highest level since 1985-86 in 2019-20. They will, 
however, remain some way short of the spending total. That leaves the three main 
components of the current fiscal framework under considerable pressure. Alongside 
setting out bold new spending plans ahead of the election, the political parties must 
therefore also be clear about what fiscal rules they intend to use to underpin their 
approaches to growing the UK state.
Spending Round 2019 has returned government expenditure to mid-
2000s levels
The Chancellor declared at September’s Spending Round that he was “turning the page” 
on austerity and “writing a new chapter in our public services”.1 For now, though, that 
chapter stretches only one year into the future and is restricted to the 43 per cent of 
government spending (total managed expenditure, or TME) that comprises Whitehall 
departmental expenditure limits (DEL). And while the changes in the Spending Round 
only go some way to reversing the cuts made since 2010, it does nevertheless herald a 
significant change of direction.
1 HM Treasury, “Spending Round 2019: Sajid Javid’s speech”, 4 September 2019
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Indeed, the Chancellor announced an extra £2.1 billion of spending in 2019-20 and an 
extra £13.4 billion in 2020-21 relative to previous plans. That converts into a year-on-year 
real-terms increase in departmental spending in 2020-21 of £13.8 billion, or 4.1 per cent 
– the largest average annual increase in departmental budgets set out at any spending 
round since 2002. 
As Figure 1 shows, the return of spending growth has certainly been a long time coming. 
Since peaking at £848 billion in 2010-11 (in 2018-19 prices), TME has been broadly flat for 
eight years. That’s the longest pause in spending growth in modern times, eclipsing the 
six-year period associated with privatisation in the 1980s and contrasting with average 
annual real-terms growth of 3 per cent recorded between 1956-57 and 2010-11. 
FIGURE 1: Austerity has resulted in an unprecedentedly long pause in UK 
spending growth
Total managed expenditure: UK, 2018-19 terms (GDP-deflator)
NOTES: Figures are adjusted for Spending Round 2019, including only those increases in departmental 
expenditure limits set out for 2019-20 and 2020-21; other forms of expenditure are assumed to be in line 
with those published at the 2019 Spring Statement. For the period beyond 2020-21, we assume that TME 
growth is in line with the March Spring Statement forecast. All figures are presented following various 
methodological changes introduced by the ONS (in relation to the treatment of student loans and public 
sector pensions for instance) in September 2019. 
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Public Finances Databank
And the spending restraint is even more marked when measured on a per capita basis 
– an approach which better reflects the lived experience of austerity. Applying the 
combined Spring Statement and Spending Round projections, the 2010-11 peak of £13,465 
wouldn’t be surpassed until 2023-24; such a 13-year hiatus would be almost double the 
previous seven-year record recorded in the 1980s.
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The post-crisis real-terms pattern has converted into a much more marked rise and fall 
in expenditure relative to the size of the economy. On that basis, Figure 2 shows that 
TME jumped in 2008-09 and 2009-10 (as output contracted and spending increased), 
before falling in every year since. The Spending Round effect is clear once again, however, 
helping to set spending back on an upward trajectory this year (2019-20) and returning 
it to 40.6 per cent of GDP in 2020-21. That’s broadly in line with its level just before the 
financial crisis struck, and significantly above the average recorded in the two decades 
prior to that. 
FIGURE 2: Government spending as a share of GDP is back to early-2000s levels
Government spending as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES: Switch from calendar year to financial year from 1955-56. Figures are adjusted for Spending Round 
2019, including only those increases in departmental expenditure limits set out for 2019-20 and 2020-21; 
other forms of expenditure are assumed to be in line with those published at the 2019 Spring Statement. 
For the period beyond 2020-21, we assume that TME growth is in line with the March Spring Statement 
forecast. All figures are presented following various methodological changes introduced by the ONS (in 
relation to the treatment of student loans and public sector pensions for instance) in September 2019. 
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Public Finances Databank
Given the main parties’ pre-election stances, spending looks set to 
head back towards 1970s levels over the coming years
This restoration of spending growth increasingly looks like marking the beginning of a 
new era for the public finances and reflects a new consensus on spending across the 
political divide. Heading into the fourth election in a decade there appears to be broad 
agreement around the need to turn the spending taps back on. 
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For example, alongside laying out some specific totals for 2019-20 and 2020-21, the 
Chancellor used the Spending Round to talk up his ambition to establish a “new 
economic plan” that would focus on shifting the UK economy from “recovery” to 
“renewal”. The clear implication was that he hoped to increase spending further still in the 
coming years – especially in relation to capital expenditure.2 
Following the cancellation of the 6 November Budget and the decision to delay the full, 
multi-year Spending Review that had been scheduled for this year into 2020, it’s not 
yet clear exactly what “renewal” entails. But he has talked previously about delivering a 
£100 billion (multi-year) “National Infrastructure Fund” targeted outside London, so we 
might expect to see further details of his capital spend ambitions in the forthcoming 
manifesto.3 What’s beyond doubt is that he envisages a growing role for the state.
The Labour Party’s ambitions in this direction are longer-held, with the 2017 election 
manifesto including new spending pledges that added more than £70 billion a year by 
2021-22.4 That total comprised £48.6 billion on day-to-day spending (including on things 
like tuition fees, childcare, the NHS, social care, public sector pay and benefits) and a ten-
year £250 billion (i.e. £25 billion a year) “National Transformation Fund” covering transport, 
energy, communications and housing infrastructure. And the recent party conference 
doubled down on the bigger state idea, with new pledges on scrapping prescription 
charges, free legal support and a new Youth Service, for example.5 
Having ‘turned a page’ then, spending is now likely to rise higher still over the forecast 
period – whatever the outcome of next month’s election. We won’t know precisely what 
the parties are planning for the coming years until the election manifestos are published, 
but it is worth speculating on what might be in store. To do so, we set out two indicative 
scenarios:
• ‘Conservative’: we take spending in 2020-21 as given, and allow RDEL to grow in 
line with GDP thereafter (reflecting an assumption that, having established a new 
baseline for day-to-day spending at the Spending Round, the Chancellor will as a 
minimum want to maintain that base). With the Conservatives having said nothing 
of note on benefit spending in recent months, we assume that annually managed 
expenditure (AME) grows in line with the Spring Statement plans. We add in extra 
spending on CDEL, to reflect the Chancellor’s stated ambition in this area. For the 
purposes of establishing an annual figure, we assume his promised £100 billion 
2 He stated that “the first priority of our new economic plan will be to rebuild our national infrastructure”. HM Treasury, “Spending 
Round 2019: Sajid Javid’s speech”, 4 September 2019. See A Corlett et al, Rounding up: Putting the 2019 Spending Round into 
context, Resolution Foundation, September 2019 for a fuller analysis.
3 “Team Saj Launch Speech: Tomorrow’s Leader, Today”, 12 June 2019
4 T Bell, “Examining the Labour Party’s economic radicalism”, Top of the Charts, Resolution Foundation, 20 September 2019. See also 
Funding Britain’s Future, Labour Party, May 2017
5 A Hossein-Pour, “At-a-glance: Here’s everything new that Labour announced at 2019 conference”, PoliticsHome, 24 September 2019
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National Infrastructure Fund relates to a five-year parliamentary term, thereby 
adding £20 billion to the previous CDEL budget by the final year of the forecast 
period.6
• ‘Labour’: we again take spending in 2020-21 as given,7 and thereafter add in the 
additional spending pledged in the 2017 manifesto.8 In total, we add £48.6 billion 
of day-to-day spending by 2023-24 (pushing the original manifesto target date out 
by two years to reflect the passing of time since publication), split between RDEL 
and benefits (AME), along with £25 billion of capital spending. We then plot a linear 
trajectory to the 2023-24 target.
Figure 3 presents the outcomes of these two scenarios. Under the indicative 
‘Conservative’ approach, spending rises to 41.3 per cent of GDP by 2023-24. That would 
be higher than in any pre-crisis year since 1984-85, and would fall only slightly under the 
42 per cent average recorded between 1966-67 and 1984-85. The ‘Labour’ scenario takes 
spending higher still: to 43.3 per cent by 2023-24. That would easily surpass the 1970s 
average, and be higher than any pre-crisis year since 1982-83. Indeed, spending as a share 
of GDP would only have been higher in eight years in the post-war period.
Ahead of the publication of the election manifestos these scenarios are no more than 
speculative. But they reflect the rhetoric delivered by the two biggest parties and 
should therefore provide some indication of the direction of travel on spending. What’s 
noticeable is that, under either approach, expenditure ends up much closer to the 
average recorded in the 1960s and 1970s than to the average of the 1980s and 1990s. 
6 The roll out of such a capital programme could of course be slower, producing a smaller annual boost to the CDEL total. But it 
would take only a very small increase in RDEL spending as a share of GDP to offset any such slowdown. That is, the same outcome 
might be achieved via a different, plausible, policy mix.
7 An incoming Labour government could choose to change the 2020-21 spending baseline, but we have assumed the same starting 
point as in the ‘Conservative’ scenario for simplicity. The destination at the end of the forecast horizon is, in any case, unaffected.
8 We make no adjustment for inflation.
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FIGURE 3: Future spending plans could push the size of the state back towards 
1970s levels
Government spending as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES:  See notes to Figure 2. ‘Conservative’ scenario takes the post-Spending Round 2019 trajectory 
as the base and then grows RDEL in line with GDP, CDEL in line with hitting an additional £20 billion a 
year by 2023-24, and AME in line with the Spring Statement 2019 projection. ‘Labour’ scenario takes the 
post-Spending Round 2019 trajectory as the base, and then grows RDEL and AME in line with hitting an 
additional £48.6 billion by 2023-24 and grows CDEL in line with hitting an additional £25 billion a year by the 
end of the forecast horizon. 
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Public Finances Databank
Such a surge in spending would bring the UK’s expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio only broadly in line with the OECD average
Changes of such an order would obviously be a very big deal from a domestic 
perspective. But it is worth reflecting on the fact that the UK’s current expenditure-to-
GDP ratio remains a little below the advanced economy norm. 
Figure 4 compares the ratio of government spending as a share of GDP across all OECD 
countries for which such data is available,9 and shows the UK rapidly approaching the 
OECD average (the ‘100’ line) ahead of the financial crisis (increasing from 80 per cent in 
1998, to 96 per cent in 2006): indeed it briefly surpassed it in the immediate aftermath 
(peaking 1 per cent above the average in 2012). However it has since fallen back in relative 
terms, with the austerity period driving it back down to 95 per cent of the OECD average 
by 2018. 
9 In order to maintain international comparability, we use the OECD-published figures for spending (rather than ONS- or OBR-
published data), with no adjustment for Spending Round 2019 or recent technical accounting adjustments.
Total managed 
expenditure
43.3%
41.3%
30%
32%
34%
36%
38%
40%
42%
44%
46%
48%
1948 1953 1958-
59
1963-
64
1968-
69
1973-
74
1978-
79
1983-
84
1988-
89
1993-
94
1998-
99
2003-
04
2008-
09
2013-
14
2018-
19
2023-
24
'Labour'
'Conservative'
Projection 
period
The shape of things to come | Charting the changing size and shape of the UK state
Resolution Foundation
21
FIGURE 4: UK spending as a share of GDP approached the OECD average ahead 
of the financial crisis, but has since fallen back below it
Indices of government spending as a share of GDP: OECD average = 100 (three-year 
averages) 
NOTES: Excludes Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico and Turkey. UK figures are not directly comparable with 
those presented elsewhere in this note.
SOURCE: RF analysis of OECD, General Government Accounts 
The scale of the spending increases implied by recent Conservative and Labour rhetoric 
might therefore mark a change of direction for the UK, but it would likely only bring the 
country more closely in line with the advanced economy average.
But spending increases are being promised at a time when the 
existing fiscal framework already looks under significant strain
Spending is only one side of the fiscal equation of course. Figure 5 adds government 
receipts to the picture, showing that these have increased as a share of GDP in recent 
years. Based on the trajectory set out at the Spring Statement (with the Spending Round 
making no difference in this instance), the level is projected to reach 38.3 per cent of 
GDP in 2020-21. That’s the highest level recorded since 1985-86, and only slightly down on 
the average recorded between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. 
The simultaneous growth in revenue and reduction in expenditure as a share of GDP over 
the past decade has helped narrow the gap between government revenue and spending 
that opened up at the time of the financial crisis. But that narrowing appears to have 
halted now, with spending projected to continue to outstrip receipts in the coming years 
– even before adding in potential post-election spending increases. 
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FIGURE 5: The gap between spending and receipts has narrowed considerably, 
but remains in place
Government spending and receipts as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES: Switch from calendar year to financial year from 1955-56. ‘SR19’ = Spending Round 2019 and 
includes only those increases in departmental expenditure limits set out for 2019-20 and 2020-21; other 
forms of expenditure are assumed to be in line with those published at the 2019 Spring Statement. For 
the period beyond 2020-21, we assume TME grows in line with the growth rates in place at March’s Spring 
Statement. All figures are presented following various methodological changes introduced by the ONS (in 
relation to the treatment of student loans and public sector pensions for instance) in September 2019.
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Public Finances Databank
As Figure 6 shows, that is very much in keeping with successive governments’ positions. 
An overall budget surplus was secured in just 12 of the 71 years between 1948 and 2018-
19, with the deficit averaging 2.5 per cent a year. On current plans, the average is set to 
drop slightly below that level (2.1 per cent) between 2019-20 and 2023-24.
Such an outcome on the deficit has obvious consequences for the stock of debt too, 
slowing the pace at which it can be reduced relative to the size of the economy. Figure 7 
presents the long-run picture. The post-crisis surge in the debt-to-GDP ratio is clear, with 
only very modest reductions in recent years. As of 2018-19, public sector net debt (PSND) 
stood at 81.7 per cent of GDP, down slightly from the 2016-17 peak of 83.8 per cent but still 
up significantly on the 2007-08 level of 34.4 per cent. As things stand it is set to continue 
falling, but only very modestly. 
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FIGURE 6: The deficit is at a 17-year low, but no longer expected to fall much 
further in the coming years
Overall deficit (public sector net borrowing, PSNB) as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES:  Switch from calendar year to financial year from 1955-56. For the period beyond 2020-21, we 
assume TME grows in line with the growth rates in place at March’s Spring Statement. All figures are 
presented following various methodological changes introduced by the ONS (in relation to the treatment of 
student loans and public sector pensions for instance) in September 2019. 
SOURCE: OBR, Public Finances Databank
FIGURE 7: Debt remains elevated, and is on course to fall only modestly as a 
share of GDP
Public sector net debt as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES:  Switch from calendar year to financial year from 1955-56. For the period beyond 2020-21, we 
assume TME grows in line with the growth rates in place at March’s Spring Statement. All figures are 
presented following various methodological changes introduced by the ONS (in relation to the treatment of 
student loans and public sector pensions for instance) in September 2019.
SOURCE: OBR, Public Finances Databank and Bank of England
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Given where we are post-Spending Round 2019, it is clear that the fiscal framework that 
guides the government’s approach is no longer in effect. 
For example, the main fiscal ‘mandate’ – which requires (structural) borrowing to be 
below 2 per cent of GDP in 2020-2110 – is almost certainly on course to be broken. Back at 
the Spring Statement, the government appeared to have £27 billion of headroom against 
the target. But the combination of the new Spending Round plans and ONS accounting 
adjustments associated with the public finance treatment of student loans and public 
sector pensions11 has removed that headroom. With the economy performing less well 
and the in-year 2019-20 borrowing figures trending higher than projected at the Spring 
Statement, borrowing currently appears on course to overshoot by some £16 billion.12 
Likewise the longer-term ‘fiscal objective’ of balancing the overall budget has long been 
abandoned in practice. It featured prominently in both the 2015 and 2017 Conservative 
Party manifestos, with the 2015 publication declaring for instance that: 
“The only way to keep our economy secure for the future is to eliminate the deficit 
entirely and start running a surplus. Anything less would be to ignore the lessons 
of the past”.13 
But it had effectively been abandoned when Philip Hammond was still Chancellor,14 and 
now appears to be even further out of reach. 
And once we factor in Sajid Javid’s desire to boost capital spending in the coming years 
and the Prime Minister’s preference for tax cuts,15 the ‘supplementary target’ of having 
debt falling as a proportion of GDP after the 2020-21 also looks under considerable threat. 
The spending debate that is set to characterise the election campaign 
must therefore be informed by some new fiscal rules
For the Conservatives then, the ‘turning of the page’ on spending must  come alongside 
a re-writing of the fiscal rules.16 Indeed, speaking at the Spending Round, the Chancellor 
promised just such a refresh ahead of the Budget: stating that it would meet “the 
economic priorities of today – not half a decade ago”.17 
10  HM Treasury, Charter for Budget Responsibility: autumn 2016 update, 17 January 2017
11  ONS, Public sector finances, UK: August 2019, 24 September 2019
12  R Hughes, J Leslie, C Pacitti & J Smith, Totally (net) worth it: The next generation of UK fiscal rules, Resolution Foundation, October 
2019 
13  Conservative Party Manifesto 2015
14  See for example, M Whittaker et al, Super, smashing, great: Spring Statement 2019 response, Resolution Foundation, 14 March 2019
15  T Bell, “Tax cuts for the rich are not the answer to the questions 21st century Britain is asking”, Resolution Foundation, 10 June 2019 
16  And we have set out detailed thoughts on what that should entail. See R Hughes, J Leslie, C Pacitti & J Smith, Totally (net) worth it: 
The next generation of UK fiscal rules, Resolution Foundation, October 2019.
17  With the fiscal mandate relating explicitly to the deficit in 2020-21, a new set of rules for subsequent years would have needed 
developing even in the absence of the government’s change of direction on austerity. HM Treasury, “Spending Round 2019: Sajid 
Javid’s speech”, 4 September 2019 
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With the Budget now cancelled, we must hope that the proposed Conservative 
framework is presented in the party’s manifesto. It will surely include a looser deficit 
target, with Sajid Javid promising the Conservative Party conference that he would be 
“taking advantage of incredibly low interest rates and borrowing to build”.18 A deficit target 
focused on current spending looks most likely. 
The new approach to debt is harder to second guess, with no mention of it in Sajid Javid’s 
conference speech. But we might again expect a rule that provides greater room than the 
existing one – reflecting the fact that capital spending cannot be removed from PSND in 
the same way that it can be removed from the borrowing target. Either a higher debt-to-
GDP ceiling or a new focus on debt servicing costs (accounting for today’s low interest 
rate environment) could feature.
The Labour Party too must underpin its election spending plans with a new fiscal 
framework proposal. We might expect something similar to the approach set out in 
2017, where the party outlined a ‘fiscal credibility rule’ that committed it to eliminating 
the current budget deficit within five years (with the manifesto laying out a sizeable 
programme of planned tax rises that precisely matched the proposed £48.6 billion 
increase in current spending)19 and ensuring debt was falling by the end of the 
parliament.20 But the latter part of this pledge is hard to square with the increased capital 
spending included in our ‘Labour’ scenario above.
Overall then the UK state, while much reduced in size as a share of national output over 
the past decade, is significantly larger than it was in the 1980s and 1990s – and is likely 
to expand further in the coming years. For now that proposed expansion looks to be 
resting in part on government borrowing, adding some urgency to the need for the next 
government to establish a new fiscal framework. 
But what about what the state actually does? How has the composition of government 
spending shifted over the austerity period, and what are the implications for the priorities 
facing the next government? That’s the issue we turn to in the next section.
18  The Conservative Party, “The Chancellor’s Speech to Conference 2019”, 31 October 2019
19  Funding Britain’s Future, Labour Party, May 2017
20  Labour’s fiscal credibility rule, Labour, 2017
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Section 3
Taking shape
Spending priorities naturally change over time, reflecting changes in political, 
economic and demographic backdrops. But the shifting shape of the state has 
been particularly pronounced over the course of the austerity decade, with the 
prioritisation of some key aspects of spending within a tight overall budget inevitably 
squeezing resources for many functions. 
Annually managed expenditure has accounted for a growing share of total spend – 
with the State Pension accounting for a large part of that – leaving less leftover to be 
shared across departments. Within that departmental total, the split between current 
and capital spend has been relatively even, though the capital profile has been 
somewhat volatile. And within the reduced current departmental total, an increasing 
share has gone to health and international aid, leaving many other departments facing 
very sizeable reductions in spending. 
As austerity has altered the size of the UK state, so too has its shifted 
its shape
As noted in Section 1, real-terms TME has been broadly flat over the past decade 
– representing a break from the usual steady upward trend recorded over previous 
decades. Within that overall constraint however, the resources flowing to different forms 
of spending have varied somewhat. By drilling down into the different splits that exist 
within the total, we can determine where the biggest spending squeezes have occurred – 
and what that has meant for the overall shape of the UK state. 
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The first split worth considering is that between the departmental expenditure limits 
(DEL) that were the subject of the recent Spending Round, and the annually managed 
expenditure (AME) total which is less predictable and less directly controllable.21 
Figure 8 shows that AME has continued to rise throughout the period of austerity, 
reflecting both cyclical factors associated with the financial crisis and deliberate policy 
choices. Adjusted for inflation and removing the effects of past reclassifications, AME 
stands at an estimated £500 billion in 2019-20; up from £442 billion in 2009-10. In contrast, 
adjusted-DEL stands at an estimated £370 billion; well down on the 2009-10 peak of £396 
billion. The 43 per cent of TME allocated to DEL in 2019-20 therefore marks a significant 
drop from the 47 per cent recorded in 2009-10. Following the Spending Round however, 
that share is set to climb back up to 44 per cent by 2023-24.
FIGURE 8: Within the broadly unchanged overall spending total, an increasing 
amount has been spent on annually managed expenditure
Total managed expenditure: UK, 2018-19 prices (GDP-deflator)
NOTES: DEL and AME figures are adjusted to removes discontinuities, where possible, such that the back 
series are consistent with the latest forecast. This includes major ONS classification changes and HMT 
policy decisions to switch spending between DEL and AME. Examples include the switching of Council Tax 
Benefit from AME to DEL in 2013-14 and the switching of localised business rates from DEL to AME in 2013-
14. These data have been adjusted to account for recent methodological shifts relating to public sector 
pensions and student loans, with the entirety of this revision assumed to sit within AME.
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outlook
21 It includes social security payments (accounting for around half the total), locally financed expenditure (12 per cent) and debt 
interest payments (9 per cent) for instance. It also includes student loans and public sector pensions – areas which have been 
subject to significant recent revision.
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Departments have accounted for a falling share of total spending, 
but the split between current and capital spending remains broadly 
unchanged
Focusing in more detail on DEL – in order to consider trends in spending on public 
services – we can observe still more shifts in the nature of government spending. Figure 9 
splits overall DEL by that element which relates to day-to-day spending (resource DEL, or 
RDEL) and that which relates to investment spending (capital DEL, or CDEL). 
FIGURE 9: Even after the increases set out in Spending Round 2019, day-to-day 
departmental spend remains below its 2010-11 peak
Departmental (DEL) spending in real-terms: UK, 2009-10=100 (GDP-deflator)
NOTES: DEL and AME figures are adjusted to removes discontinuities, where possible, such that the back 
series are consistent with the latest forecast. This includes major ONS classification changes and HMT 
policy decisions to switch spending between DEL and AME. Examples include the switching of Council Tax 
Benefit from AME to RDEL in 2013-14 and the switching of localised business rates from RDEL to AME in 
2013-14.
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outlook
As of 2019-20, RDEL is down 5.2 per cent on its 2009-10 peak. The extra spending set out 
for 2020-21 as part of the Spending Round is set to narrow that gap to 1 per cent, but – 
ahead of any post-election spending increases – RDEL is set to be just 2.7 per cent higher 
in 2023-24 than it was in 2009-10. 
CDEL has fallen further (and evolved more erratically), to stand 13.2 per cent, down on 
2009-10 in 2019-20. But that is a product of the spike in capital spending associated 
with the fiscal stimulus delivered in the immediate post-crisis period. Taking the more 
appropriate baseline of 2007-08, we can see that the 2019-20 CDEL total is up 2.8 per cent 
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(compared with equivalent growth of 1.5 per cent in RDEL). The split between RDEL and 
CDEL has barely altered over this timeframe.22
The longer-run trend in capital spending is more clearly shown in Figure 10. It details 
public sector net investment (PSNI) in the period since 1948, and highlights the long 
upward drift from the lows of the 1980s and 1990s recorded since the turn of the century. 
After adding in the effect of the recent Spending Round, PSNI is projected to rise to 2.6 
per cent of GDP in 2020-21. Outside of the spike in 2008-09 and 2009-10, that would be 
the highest level of investment since 1978-79. 
FIGURE 10: Net investment could be returning to mid-1970s levels
Public sector net investment as a share of GDP: UK 
NOTES: Switch from calendar year to financial year from 1955-56. See notes to Figure 3.
SOURCE: RF analysis of OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outlook
By way of illustration, the chart also plots the PSNI paths that would be associated with 
the ‘Conservative’ and ‘Labour’ scenarios described in Section 2. It is worth stressing 
again that these scenarios are speculative ahead of the publication of the election 
manifestos, but they are in line with the prevailing rhetoric in the two parties. In both 
instances, PSNI would rise to levels last prevailing in the mid-1970s – before the era of 
privatisation.
22 Nevertheless, RDEL has fallen as a share of TME from 40 per cent in 2007-08, to 39 per cent in 2009-10 and 36 per cent in 2019-20. 
And it has fallen as a share of GDP from 16 per cent in 2007-08 and 18 per cent in 2009-10, to just 14 per cent in 2019-20.
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But the split in spending across departments is much altered, 
resulting in very sizeable reductions in some departmental budgets
So overall spending has been broadly flat over the past decade, and departmental 
spending remains lower today than it was back in 2009-10. But how has this tighter 
spending backdrop played out across different public services? 
Figure 11 offers some insight. It details the real-terms per capita change in RDEL spending 
recorded between 2009-10 and 2019-20 across different government departments, 
alongside the post-Spending Round plans for 2020-21. It shows that the new plans have 
the effect of reversing sizeable elements of austerity in some departments, but that very 
significant funding cuts are set to remain in place in many cases.
FIGURE 11: Spending Round 2019 reversed part of the austerity cuts to 
departmental spending, but budgets remain much smaller than they were in 
many areas
Cumulative real-terms change in per-capita RDEL since 2009-10: UK (GDP-deflator)
NOTES: Figures are adjusted as far as possible to account for machinery of government changes.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA, various and HMT, Spending Round 2019
It highlights also just how markedly outcomes vary across different departments. At 
one extreme, Local Government RDEL per capita is due to be three-quarters (77 per 
cent) lower in 2020-21 than in 2009-10, while many other departments (including Work 
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and Pensions, Transport, BEIS, Scotland and Justice for example) are facing reductions 
of between roughly one-third and one-half. But at the other end of the spectrum, the 
overall drop in per capita RDEL is translating into increases of 1 per cent (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office), 7 per cent (Home Office and International Development) and 14 
per cent (Health & Social Care). 
These differences of course reflect competing political priorities. The NHS has been 
consistently protected from the spending cuts of the past decade for instance, and 
the above-inflation five-year funding settlement announced in June 2018 was sold as 
an explicit attempt to “regain core performance and lay the foundations for service 
improvements”.23 
Other services have received partial protection or prioritisation at different times too. For 
example, Spending Review 2010 protected the real-terms schools budget for 5-16 year-
olds and committed the government to increasing foreign aid spending to 0.7 per cent of 
gross national income from 2013. Additional pupil premium protection was included in 
Spending Review 2013,24 while Spending Review 2015 added a pledge to ensure defence 
spending didn’t drop below 2 per cent of GDP before the end of the decade. Such 
protections, delivered within a shrinking overall spending envelope and often applying 
to already large parts of the spending total, have resulted in the ‘residualisation’ of many 
other public services. 
The impact of all this is apparent in Figure 12, which details how the composition of 
RDEL has shifted across departments over the austerity decade. The most obvious 
change is the huge increase in the share of RDEL flowing to Health & Social Care, with 
the proportion increasing by a third (from 31 per cent to 40 per cent) between 2009-10 
and 2020-21. The shares accounted for by the Department of Education and the Ministry 
of Defence have remained broadly unchanged, and the Department for International 
Development has grown quite considerably (while still only accounting for 2 per cent of 
total RDEL). In contrast, the share flowing to all other departments is down by 26 per cent 
(from 38 per cent in 2009-10 to 28 per cent in 2020-21.25
The distribution of capital spending across departments has altered less dramatically, 
though. Transport, which accounts for the largest share of the total, has increased its 
share by 12 per cent (from 20 per cent in 2009-10 to 22 per cent in 2020-21). And BEIS, 
which has the second largest capital budget, has lowered its share by 10 per cent (from 16 
per cent to 14 per cent). 
23 DHSC press release, “Prime Minister sets out 5-year NHS funding plan”, 18 June 2018
24 The premium was introduced in 2011 to provide publicly-funded schools in England extra money to help them raise the attainment 
of disadvantaged children. The Spending Review committed to maintain the rates of payment.
25 Within this total, the share of RDEL going to the Home Office is up 23 per cent (from 3 per cent to 4 per cent). But the share going 
to Local Government is down 73 per cent (from 7 per cent to 2 per cent), the share accounted for by Work & Pensions is down 
64 per cent (5 per cent to 2 per cent), the Transport share is down 45 per cent (from 2 per cent to 1 per cent), and Housing & 
Communities is down 44 per cent (1.4 per cent to 0.8 per cent). 
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FIGURE 12: 40p of every £1 spent by government on day-to-day departmental 
spending is accounted for by health, up from 31p in the pre-austerity era
Composition of RDEL by department: UK
NOTES: Figures are adjusted as far as possible to account for machinery of government changes.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA, various and HMT, Spending Round 2019
Taken together, it is the RDEL movements which dominate though – reflecting the much 
larger amounts involved – as highlighted by the change in composition of total DEL set 
out in Figure 13. 
FIGURE 13: After accounting for capital spending too, health accounts for one-
third of day-to-day departmental expenditure, up from one-quarter in 2009-10
Composition of total DEL by department: UK
NOTES:  Figures are adjusted as far as possible to account for machinery of government changes.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA, various and HMT, Spending Round 2019
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The nature of social security spending has also changed considerably, 
with pensioner and working-age totals diverging
Switching to a consideration of what sits beneath the trend in AME over the past decade, 
it is worth focusing on what has happened to its biggest single component: social 
security. As with DEL, the overall trend masks movement within the total – with the split 
between spending on pensioners and on others being the major point of interest. 
The share of GDP accounted for by social security spending among both pensioner and 
non-pensioner groups has shifted not just in this more recent period, but dating back to 
the late-1970s. This is shown in Figure 14, which focuses on Great Britain rather than the 
UK. It highlights the cyclical nature of spend on non-pensioners in particular, but also the 
extent to which the gap in spending between pensioners and others narrowed over the 
three decades prior to the financial crisis before widening thereafter. 
FIGURE 14: Welfare spending has accounted for a rising share of GDP over time, 
but the proportion flowing to non-pensioners has fallen markedly in recent 
years
Welfare spend as a share of GDP: Great Britain
NOTES:  Council Tax Benefit was abolished in 2013-14, with support instead transferring to the local level. 
These figures include adjustments to account for this shift.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP Benefit Expenditure Tables, MCHLG, Scottish government and Welsh 
government data
Between 1978-79 and 1990-91, pensioner benefit spending amounted to an average of 
4.9 per cent of GDP while spending on working-age adults and children amounted to 4.1 
per cent of GDP. That 0.8 percentage point gap more than halved between 1991-92 and 
2007-08, with pensioner benefit spend rising only modestly to 5.1 per cent of GDP and 
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other spending jumping to 4.7 per cent of GDP. Indeed, a combination of elevated non-
pensioner spending during the early 1990s recession, and a reduction in the pensioner 
total, meant that the former actually outstripped the latter for a brief period in the mid-
1990s. 
The gap widened again in the aftermath of the financial crisis, however. Spending rose for 
both groups – driven in part by the initial pass-through of the inflation spike in the form 
of benefit uprating – with the average social security spend between 2008-09 and 2019-20 
jumping to 6.1 per cent of GDP for pensioners and 5.3 per cent of GDP for others; but the 
0.8 percentage point gap of the 1980s was restored. 
Under the projections set out at the Spring Statement, that gap looks set to widen to 1.2 
percentage points. That’s the product of combining a return to growth in the pensioner 
social security spend (with the average from 2019-20 to 2023-24 projected to stand at 5.7 
per cent of GDP) with a continued fall in non-pensioner spending (such that the average 
from 2019-20 to 2023-24 is projected to drop to just 4.5 per cent of GDP – taking it back 
below the pre-crisis average). 
In single-year terms, social security spending on pensioners is set to rise from 5.4 per 
cent of GDP in 2007-08 to 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2023-24 (an 8.3 per cent rise); whereas 
spending on working-age adults and children is set to fall from 4.7 per cent of GDP to 4.5 
per cent of GDP (a drop of 4.6 per cent) over the same period. Measuring the spending 
totals in real-terms instead of relative to the size of the economy, the projected changes 
over the 16-year period stand instead at 32 per cent for pensioners and 16 per cent for 
others.
These spending trends are driven in part by underlying economic conditions and by 
demographics. Expenditure on unemployment benefits spikes during recessions, for 
instance. And the timing of the arrival of the baby boomer cohort into retirement affects 
the pensioner welfare bill. But clearly policy choices matter too. 
The raising of the State Pension age in recent years (first for women and more recently 
for all), has helped to slow growth in State Pension spending. But the other big factor 
over the past decade has been the political decision to protect the State Pension (via 
the introduction of the triple lock in 2011, whereby its value grows each year by highest of 
inflation, earnings or 2.5 per cent) while cutting the generosity of working-age benefits. 
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Indeed, selected initial real-terms cuts have been followed by a four-year freeze in the 
cash value of many benefits, and supplemented by changes in eligibility rules.26
The distinction between demographics and policy choice is brought out in Figure 15. It 
shows the value of social security spending for the two population groups adjusted for 
their size – that is, the per person generosity of the different benefit payments. 
FIGURE 15: Increased spending on pensioners has been driven not just by 
demographics but by rising generosity too
Real-terms welfare spend per person: Great Britain, 2007-08 = 100 (GDP-deflator) 
NOTES: Council Tax Benefit was abolished in 2013-14, with support instead transferring to the local level. 
These figures include adjustments to account for this shift. Population statistics are adjusted to account 
for changes in the State Pension Age over time.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP Benefit Expenditure Tables, MCHLG, Scottish government, Welsh 
government data and ONS population statistics 
Again the cyclical nature of spending on the working-age and children group is evident, 
with spikes coinciding clearly with economic turmoil. But what’s also clear is the broadly 
similar directions of travel followed by the per capita measures ahead of the financial 
26 We can consider some of the larger cuts in more detail. For example, the cash values of Child Benefit, Universal Credit, (non-
disability) Tax Credits, Housing Benefit limits, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support, and Employment and Support Allowance 
(except the support group component) have all been held constant in cash terms between 2015-16 and 2019–20. This has led to a 
6 per cent real-terms cut in the level of those benefits. In addition, the introduction of a two-child limit means children born after 
6 April 2017 are no longer eligible for the child element of Universal Credit or tax credits if they already have two older siblings in 
receipt. The £545 family element payable to all tax credit and Universal Credit recipients with children was likewise removed from 
April 2017, as was the family premium in Housing Benefit. From the same date, the work-related activity component of Employment 
and Support Allowance (ESA) and the Universal Credit equivalent (payable to those claimants assessed as falling into the “Work-
Related Activity Group”) was also abolished – bringing the payment into line with Jobseeker’s Allowance. Income disregards and 
work allowances in Universal Credit have also been cut back. Housing Benefit has been cut for some by the tightening of the Local 
Housing Allowance and by the introduction of an under-occupancy reduction for those in social housing who live in a property that 
is deemed to have more bedrooms than needed. The benefits cap has also placed a limit on the maximum any single family can 
receive in social security payments. The tightening of Child Benefit eligibility from January 2013 also produced large savings for the 
government.
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crisis. They have diverged very markedly in recent years however. As of 2019-20, per 
person social security spend is up in real-terms relative to 2007-08 by 15.7 per cent among 
pensioners but just 2.1 per cent among working-age adults and children. And by 2023-24, 
those figures are projected to stand at 21.4 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively.
Once again then, the post-crisis phase has made a significant difference to the 
composition of overall social security spending. Figure 16 presents the details. It makes 
clear the increased dominance of the State Pension in the overall picture, with the share 
allocated to this payment increasing by 19 per cent (from 37 per cent to 44 per cent) 
between 2007-08 and 2020-21.27 
FIGURE 16: The share of all welfare spending accounted for by the State 
Pension has jumped from 37 per cent to 44 per cent 
Composition of welfare spending: Great Britain
NOTES: ‘State Pension’ includes State Pension transfers. ‘Disability & Incapacity benefits’ includes Armed 
Forces Independence Payments, Attendance Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, Mobility Allowance, 
Personal Independence Payments, Employment & Support Allowance (and UC equivalents), Incapacity 
Benefit, Invalidity Benefit, Severe Disability Allowance and Sickness benefit. ‘Tax credits’ cover Working 
Tax Credits, Child Tax Credits and the Working Family Tax Credit. ‘Child Benefit’ additionally includes One 
Parent Allowance and Guardian’s Allowance. Council Tax Benefit was abolished in 2013-14, with support 
instead transferring to the local level. These figures include adjustments to account for this shift in the ‘All 
others’ category. War Pensions are also added back in, having been removed from DWP data after 2001-02.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP Benefit Expenditure Tables, MCHLG, Scottish government and Welsh 
government data 
In proportional terms however, the 33 per cent increase in the share of total spending 
27  The use of 2007-08 as a starting point differs from the public services analysis set out in Figure 12 and Figure 13, which considered 
how the shape of expenditure had changed since 2009-10. That’s in order to avoid taking as our start year a period in which 
recession-relevant welfare spending was particularly elevated. We are concerned in this instance instead with how today’s social 
security make up compares with the steady-state that existed ahead of the crisis.
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accounted for by disability and incapacity payments (from 14 per cent to 19 per cent) is 
even more pronounced. In contrast, the share of spending accounted for by Child Benefit 
has fallen by 24 per cent (from 7 per cent to 5 per cent). And the share of all benefits not 
otherwise listed is down 41 per cent (from 20 per cent to 12 per cent).
Austerity has dominated the fiscal landscape over the past decade, with much attention 
drawn to the range of areas in which government spending has been cut or in which 
historical rates of growth have at least been lowered. But the protection and prioritisation 
of some forms of expenditure within this constrained overall spending envelope has 
resulted in a very significant change in what the state does – both in terms of public 
services and in terms of social security. 
That leaves the suspicion that at least some of this change is the product of a series of 
politically pragmatic decisions taken in isolation, rather than a carefully crafted strategic 
overview. Yet when these individual spending changes in public services and in welfare 
are added up, they result in a significant reshaping of the role of the state. And it is a 
reshaping that is likely to continue in the coming years as demographic headwinds start 
to blow with increasing intensity. That’s the focus of the next section. 
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Section 4
Shaping the future
The role of the state has shifted significantly over the past two decades, with spending 
on pensions and health accounting for a growing share of the total. In contrast, the 
shares of defence, public order and safety and housing and community services have 
all shrunk. These have largely been the result of policy choices – set within an overall 
context of a state that has grown in size over the longer period, but been subject most 
recently to an unprecedented decade of austerity. 
Even more profound changes look set to follow over the medium-term, flowing this 
time from demographic pressures. Crucially, our ageing population is likely to push 
in the same direction as the policy choices that have prevailed over the past two 
decades, concentrating state spending even more on the old and the sick. Absent 
cuts in other spending or a change in how the state seeks to meet this demand, the 
implication is that total expenditure will need to continue to rise as a share of GDP. 
Taken together, our state is now significantly more focused on health 
and on the old than has been the case in the past
Figure 17 brings together the analysis of public service and social security spending set 
out in Section 3, showing how the share of overall UK government spending allocated to 
different functions has evolved since 1997-98.28 Six important conclusions stand out.
28  The timeframe considered differs once again from that used in earlier sections. In this instance the analysis runs only to 2018-19, 
reflecting the latest year for which such detailed ‘function’ data is available. It therefore takes no account of the expenditure set 
out as part of Spending Round 2019. We have, however, made a manual adjustment to the education total (and the overall total) to 
account for the new student loans accounting treatment.
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FIGURE 17: Public sector expenditure is increasingly focused on health and on 
old age social security
Composition of public sector expenditure by ‘function’: UK
NOTES: All other’ includes: culture & religion, agriculture, energy, general public services and EU 
transactions. Education spend is adjusted to account for the new student loan accounting treatment.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA, various; Eurostat, ESA 2010 Table 1100; ONS, Public sector finances
• First, the share of total spending accounted for by social security has fallen over the 
longer period. The 2018-19 total (36 per cent) is higher than the 2007-08 one (34 per 
cent), but it is down 5 per cent on the 1997-98 figure (38 per cent). 
• Secondly however, within that overall reduction the share allocated to old age 
welfare spending has increased. Having accounted for 14 per cent of public sector 
expenditure in 1997-98, such spending now comprises 17 per cent of the total. 
• Third, the other big increase relates to health. Such spending (covering medical 
services, medical research and central services) accounted for £1 of every £5 spent 
on the public sector in 2018-19, up by 38 per cent on the 1997-98 share – twice the 
proportional increase recorded in relation to old age welfare spending.
• Fourth, the share of spend allocated to defence has fallen by 28 per cent (from 7 per 
cent in 1997-98 to 5 per cent in 2018-19). A similar pattern holds in relation to the 
share of spending accounted for by public order and safety, which has fallen by 23 
per cent (from 5 per cent to 4 per cent).
• Fifth, spending shares have increased significantly in relation to transport (up 
30 per cent over the period) and the environment (up 17 per cent). But they have 
fallen for housing/community services like housing development, street lighting 
and community development (down 16 per cent) and general economic and labour 
affairs (down 7 per cent).
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 • Sixth, the biggest proportional drop of all relates to debt interest payments. Such 
expenditure accounted for 9 per cent of public sector spend in 1997-98, but just 5 per 
cent in 2018-19. This has occurred despite the large increase in public sector debt 
over this period, and is driven by the historically low level of today’s interest rates. 
And the expectation is that this policy-driven shift will continue into 
the future, driven this time by demographic change
Figure 18 amalgamates some of the function groupings above and uses OBR projections 
to consider how expenditure on each might evolve over the coming decades. It is, of 
course, only as good as the assumptions that underpin it – but it has the merit of being 
predominantly policy neutral.29 That is, the trends described are those which might apply 
in the absence of policy change, and are therefore driven primarily by demographic and 
economic factors. 
FIGURE 18: The share of GDP accounted for by spending on health and old age 
social protection could rocket over the coming decades
Outturn and projected non-debt interest public sector expenditure as a share of GDP: 
UK
NOTES: Other spending’ includes: defence, police/prisons, housing/community, economy, environment, 
culture & religion, agriculture, energy, general public services and EU transactions. Education spend is 
adjusted to account for the new student loan accounting treatment.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA (various) and ONS, ESA Table 11; OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report 2018; 
ONS, Public sector finances
29  More specifically, the OBR modelling includes the spending set out under the five-year NHS funding settlement, but not the 
departmental totals detailed in Spending Round 2019. It assumes also that the State Pension triple-lock remains in place 
throughout. In this analysis, debt interest payments are removed from the total – in line with the OBR approach.
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It suggests that, all else equal, non-debt interest spending as a share of GDP is set to 
rise considerably over the coming years. Relative to the 2018-19 outturn, the spending-
to-GDP ratio is projected to rise by 22 per cent by 2067-68. Applying such an increase to 
the 30.9 per cent of GDP baseline recorded (including debt interest) in Figure 2, results 
in TME ending the period at 48.8 per cent of GDP – a figure well above the post-war peak 
of 46.6 per cent of GDP reached in 2009-10. If the next government chooses to increase 
spending on some functions above that demanded by the demographic headwind, then 
this increase may end up being even greater still.
That’s obviously a very significant change, and one that doesn’t necessarily have to come 
to pass. But even if only some of this increase is delivered in practice, it still has very 
important implications for all of our futures: implications that the next government would 
do well to contemplate as it sets out its new programme of spending priorities.
It is important therefore, to understand what is driving the projected increase. The 
answer lies overwhelmingly with the projected trends in spending on old age social 
security and on health – factors which lie in turn with the ageing of our population. Such 
expenditure is modelled to rise from a combined 13 per cent of GDP in 2018-19, to 15 per 
cent of GDP by 2028-29 and 17 per cent of GDP by 2038-39. By the end of the projection, 
in 2067-68, health (14 per cent) and old age (8 per cent) spending is together expected to 
amount to 22 per cent of GDP – up two-thirds (67 per cent) on the 2018-19 ratio.
Put another way, as shown in Figure 19, old age social security and health expenditure 
could together account for half (50 per cent) of all non-debt interest spending by 2067-68. 
Within this, health spending on its own could account for close to one-third (31 per cent) 
of the total. In contrast, the share of total spending accounted for by non-old age social 
security drops from 19 per cent in 2017-18 to 13 per cent in 2067-68 under this modelling. 
And the share flowing to education falls from 13 per cent to just 9 per cent.
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FIGURE 19: Spending on health and on the old could account for nearly 50p of 
every £1 of non-debt interest spending by the middle of the decade
Outturn and projected composition of non-debt interest public sector expenditure on 
services: UK
NOTES: All other’ includes: defence, transport, police & prisons, housing, the economy, the environment, 
culture & religion, agriculture, energy, general public services, debt interest payments and EU transactions.
SOURCE: RF analysis of HMT, PESA (various) and ONS, ESA Table 11; OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report 2018
But these proportions are calculated on the assumption that increased spending on 
health and on the old does nothing to crowd out expenditure on other functions. Future 
governments will almost certainly adopt policies designed to head off some part of the 
challenge. 
That may involve meeting the increased healthcare and pensions bill by squeezing 
spending on other services – doubling down on some of the austerity-related trends. 
Alternatively, it may involve altering the healthcare or pension offer available to citizens 
– reducing access, scaling back provision and/or pushing some services into the private 
sector. Simply meeting the increased bill will require a big increase in government 
revenues – and therefore tax. All of the choices are difficult, and all represent further 
fundamental change in the nature of the British state.
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Section 5
Conclusion
With austerity now over, the coming election campaign is set to be marked not just by 
Brexit but by a flurry of new spending promises. Some of these will be designed to ease 
pressures in those public services most visibly and most immediately under strain; some 
will focus on supporting future economic growth – with both main parties talking up the 
need for a renewed period of investment in infrastructure; some will inevitably be made 
with an eye to winning votes. 
Yet it is vital that political parties take a step back too, in order to design a spending plan 
that simultaneously tries to deal with the legacy of austerity and the coming challenges 
from demographic change. This will mean implementing a new fiscal framework that 
reflects the realities of today’s economy and offers sustainability for the public finances.
Such plans must operate against the backdrop of a state that has already changed in a 
significant way. Austerity has of course played a key role, producing an unprecedentedly 
long pause in spending growth. This of course sets the context within which all other 
decisions are made. But the policy choices we have made within that constrained 
context have had a profound impact too, concentrating a greater share of expenditure on 
healthcare and on the old and squeezing out many other functions.
Heading into the 2020s, the ageing of our population is set to double-down on this policy-
generated change, driving ever more public resource towards supporting the old and 
the sick. There are therefore many tough decisions ahead, and likely further profound 
changes in the nature of what the state does. The outcome of the 2019 election could go 
a long way to determining how that plays out.
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